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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:				NO.	
SR/2		Aud			
				DATE	
		JUL 22 1954			
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
REC'D	FWD'D				
1. Chief. SR/2		22 1954		[]	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007
2.					
3. SR/COP		[]		[]	go ahead []
4.				[]	6/29 []
5.					
6.					
7. CSR2		AUG 12 1954		[]	[] is not correct in his comment on para 2. Gordon Stewart has left it open.
8.					
9.					
10. A6				[]	7-9.
11.					
12.					
13.		Unless POPS can do the whole			View latest developments and tell case officer's public PCS to Germany make no plans for factory aspects that area based on U.S. — see what you can do from there.
14.					
15.					

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KYDAR

PROPOSED AECHAMP SPRING OF 1955 OPERATION

1. Mission

To establish support points within Lithuania for future operations to that or other USSR areas, and to obtain positive and operational intelligence concerning the Lithuanian USSR.

2. Agents

*Turned down
by CFS
E82*

It is contemplated that two agents will be dispatched. One agent has already been assessed with satisfactory results and is awaiting Chief, FI Exception approval. The second agent will be selected after assessment of several prospects is completed.

3. Timing

It is anticipated that training of one agent will begin about 1 October 1954, with the second entering training approximately 1 December 1954. Training and briefing will be completed by 1 May 1955. Dispatch will be during the month of May 1955. A tentative requirement for air dispatch will be levied upon the Air Support Section, upon approval of this plan.

4. Means of Infiltration

The following means of infiltration are the most probable (in order of their listing):

- a. By parachute
- b. Overland through the Murmansk area
- c. By balloon

The exact means is contingent upon the degree of success of other Baltic operations carried out before Spring 1955.

5. Operational Plan

If entry into Lithuania is through 4a or 4c above, agents will carry W/T equipment which will be immediately cached. Subsequent to this action (or immediately upon entrance into Lithuania if entry was through means described in paragraph 4b above), agents will approach selected contact points in Lithuania for housing. After secure accomodations have been procured, they will approach other contacts with the intent of recruiting them to act as resident agents. If the recruitment is successful, the new agents will be trained in S/W or W/T techniques, as well as in elementary tradecraft. After the training is completed, the resident agents will be placed in W/T or S/W contact with KUBARK, and the two infiltrated agents will attempt exfiltration.

6. Exfiltration

The agents will attempt to return to the West overland, either through the Karelian SSR area, or across the Lithuanian-Polish border, thence through Poland and East Germany. The means of exfiltration are contingent, respectively, upon:

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- a. SR/2's success with current operations across the Karelian SSR-Finnish or Karelian SSR-Norwegian border.
- b. A determination of the security of the [] contacts on the Lithuanian-Polish border and in Poland and success in our attempts to establish an exfiltration route across the Lithuanian-Polish border using leads obtained from a letter channel between the U.S. and Lithuania and Poland.

7. Contacts in Lithuania

It is envisaged that the contacts used by agents in Lithuania (both for safehouses and for recruitment and training) will come from the following two sources, unless more reliable leads are developed in the meantime:

- a. Contacts furnished by []: [] has named some people in Lithuania who are promising not only because they appear to be willing to be involved in resistance/intelligence activities, but also because they occupy positions in the Soviet commercial system which enable them to furnish valuable assistance to our agents, as well as to have an unusual degree of freedom for movement themselves. There are two reservations concerning use of these [] contacts, however: First, the possibility of RIS control. Although it appears, through all the technical means at our disposal, that [] is not a witting Soviet agent, the RIS could, unknown to him, be aware of his escape from Lithuania and thus have his contacts under observation. Secondly, the time lag between [] escape from Lithuania--1952--and the date of the operational use of his contacts--1955--is long enough to make the contacts somewhat "stale." This may be partially overcome by having [] write letters (to be mailed in the USSR) to his contacts with the hope that they would reply and give some indication as to their current status.
- b. Existing Mail Channels: It is intended to develop one or two reliable contact points in Lithuania as a result of exploiting correspondence channels between the Lithuanian SSR and the U.S. Although this type of contact point will be the most current it will be very difficult to determine, before the agents' dispatch, the circumstances under which the Lithuanian correspondent lives and whether he is definitely trustworthy. In any case, at least a one way channel (from the agent to the U.S.) could possibly be established. *as*

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8. Training

The awkwardness of dual starting dates for training (see paragraph 3 above) is recognized. However, attempts will be made to insure that the time the first agent spends training alone will be utilized for subjects in which his aptitude is somewhat deficient, such as Russian language and W/T. The training program will consist of the usual tradecraft, Soviet reality, etc., subjects. W/T will be taught to at least the first agent. Both agents will receive very intensive training in S/W, including numerous practice letters under imagined operating conditions. In order to minimize the weight of the equipment with which the agents will enter the USSR, an attempt will be made to train them to get along without the various operational gadgets and gear that is normally available. Instead, the agents will be encouraged to plan on improvising and procuring within the USSR. The training program will be discussed with DOB as soon as this tentative plan is approved.

9. Support

- (1) Logistics. Operational material will be requisitioned from SR/LOG upon approval of this plan.
- (2) Operational Currency. The agents will carry a total of approximately 50,000 Rubles--30,000 for this operation, and 20,000 will be cached for future use in Lithuania.
- (3) Documentation. Documentation requirements will be discussed with TSS upon approval of this tentative plan.

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